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Background
The process for managing NASA human system risks (health 
and performance) is owned by the Human System Risk Board 
(HSRB).
Each of these 32 HSRB risks is assessed for its likelihood and 
consequence (LxC) scores or risk ratings using HSRB scales. 
23 of these risks define the HRP research portfolio.
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Risk Ratings
HRP research work produces evidence for the HSRB risk 
assessment process that generates risk ratings.  
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Other HSRB 
considerations
 LxC scores are helpful  in determining direction of 
mitigation work to achieve acceptable risk levels.
Traditional Engineering Risk Assessment
A lot of NASA engineering systems use quantitative 
risk methods (e.g. ISS, Shuttle). 
The approach is generally based on an aggregate of 
quantitative assessments at the subsystem level.
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*ISS Program recently kicked off a more traditional Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) for the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU).
Aspects of Traditional Engineering Systems
Can be evaluated on a subsystem, subassembly, or 
component level.
 Interfaces are concretely defined.
Can be replicated into identical units with same behavior 
and response. 
 Can (almost) eliminate element of chance or variance.
 Allows for multiple forms of design verification.
Can be subjected to destructive testing.
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Human systems and human system risks have unique issues 
that are difficult to  address using  methods nominally used 
for traditional hardware and software systems…
9
In contrast…
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Uniqueness of the Human System
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SYSTEM
Human 
physiology is so 
complicated –
hundreds of 
complex 
feedback loops 
so connectivity 
between 
subsystems is 
difficult to fully 
understand or 
model.
Hard to predict precise physiological impacts of 
spaceflight hazards and effectiveness of 
countermeasures because…
 Human systems can’t be designed identically like 
engineering systems can.
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Uniqueness of the Human System
Source: theafrolounge.com
 Human systems have the exceptional ability to heal 
and repair themselves at differing rates.
12
vs.
Uniqueness of the Human System
 Various factors impact individual responses. 
2013 Astronaut Class
Uniqueness of the Human System
Human systems can’t be tested to failure to generate useful 
data points –
i.e. we remain uncertain about human threshold break 
points and susceptibility thresholds.
Uniqueness of the Human System
Source: truthalerts.com
Other Constraints for Human System Risk 
Assessment
 Limited spaceflight data to support risks - astronaut 
population is small within 55 years of spaceflight history.
Data collection protocols different over time – no 
consistency in spaceflight data.
 Need epidemiological expertise to analyze data.
We rely on broader body of evidence from terrestrial sources 
from which we can only make inferences about human 
spaceflight risks.
 E.g., terrestrial population clinical data, analog data, 
ground experiments
Human System Risk Assessment
 For human system risks, NASA primarily uses  
qualitative risk methods.
 Each risk represents only an aspect of a subsystem of 
the human body ‘system’ so parts do not necessarily 
sum up to the whole. 
Each subsystem is too broad to cover only one 
health/performance risk. 
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How are the unique issues addressed?
HSRB doesn’t use any systematic approach but considers the 
complexity of the human system and integration of risks…
 In describing risks to properly assess LxC...e.g,
 How do possible virulence changes in microorganisms 
(Microhost Risk) interact with potential changes in the 
immune system that would be manifested in clinical 
outcomes (Immune Risk)?
 How does fatigue (Sleep Risk) impact crew performance 
during critical tasks (Task Risk and Human-Robotics 
Risk)?
…And in directing work to different entities to ultimately 
lower LxC…e.g., 
 Could work for a risk create or exacerbate another 
risk? 
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Do fluid shift control 
devices (for Visual 
Impairment Risk)
negatively impact neuro-
vestibular issues 
(Sensorimotor Risk)?
How are the unique issues addressed?
 Could work for a risk partially mitigate another risk?  
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To what extent do exercise 
countermeasures (for Muscle Risk) lead to…
stronger bones? 
(Bone Risk)
healthier minds? 
(Behavioral Risk)
How are the unique issues addressed?
Source: i.kinja-img.com
Source: businesswolf.org
Source: patriothealthreport.com
lower risk of 
radiation illness? 
(Radiation Risk)
 HSRB is flexible with risk assessment approaches to use 
on the best available evidence  –
 Quantitative models when available – e.g. HRP 
medical system model, HRP radiation risk models 
Integrated Medical Model
How are the unique issues addressed?
 Subject Matter Expert opinion – flight surgeons, 
scientists and engineers…
 Combination of approaches - semi-quantitative 
Source: kamaladevi.com
How are the unique issues addressed?
Assumptions and rationale for judgments are 
documented.
 For consistency, LxC analyses use only the applicable 
existing countermeasures and standards for 
exploration missions. 
 Guidelines for risk assessment and applicable rules-of-
thumb are being developed.
Source: asset-tilburg.nl Source: atleastihaveabrain.files.wordpress.com
How are the unique issues addressed?
What about HRP? 
 HRP tracks shared tasks and gaps in research plans 
among the risks and across Elements 
How are the unique issues addressed?
HRP Human Research Roadmap 
http://humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/
 HRP uses a taxonomy framework to develop insights on 
potential integration points between risks.
Taxonomy for  
human system 
variables
How are the unique issues addressed?
 HRP is exploring genomics research to understand 
individual variation and potentially develop personalized 
countermeasures. 
Source: enterrasolutions.com
How are the unique issues addressed?
Conclusions
The general approach for quantitative risk assessments of 
engineering systems at NASA is difficult to apply to 
human system risks.
HSRB considers how the complexity of human systems 
and unique nature of these risks impact LxC assessment.
HRP incorporates these same considerations in the design 
of research plans and in its research management 
framework.
The HRP Risk Team supports the HSRB in improvements to 
and execution of the risk assessment process (and the risk 
management process in general).
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